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ADAPTIVE FINANCIAL REGULATION
AND REGTECH: A CONCEPT ARTICLE ON
REALISTIC PROTECTION FOR VICTIMS OF
BANK FAILURES
LAWRENCE G. BAXTER†
ABSTRACT
Frustrated by the seeming inability of regulators and prosecutors to
hold bank executives to account for losses inflicted by their companies
before, during, and since the financial crisis of 2008, some scholars
have suggested that private-attorney-general suits such as class action
and shareholder derivative suits might achieve better results. While a
few isolated suits might be successful in cases where there is provable
fraud, such remedies are no general panacea for preventing large-scale
bank-inflicted losses. Large losses are nearly always the result of
unforeseeable or suddenly changing economic conditions, poor
business judgment, or inadequate regulatory supervision—usually a
combination of all three.
Yet regulators face an increasingly complex task in supervising
modern financial institutions. This Article explains how the challenge
has become so difficult. It argues for preserving regulatory discretion
rather than reducing it through formal congressional direction. The
Article also asserts that regulators have to develop their own
sophisticated methods of automated supervision. Although also not a
panacea, the development of “RegTech” solutions will help clear away
volumes of work that understaffed and underfunded regulators cannot
keep up with. RegTech will not eliminate policy considerations, nor will
it render regulatory decisions noncontroversial. Nevertheless, a
sophisticated deployment of RegTech should help focus regulatory
discretion and public-policy debate on the elements of regulation where
choices really matter.
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FOREWORD

It is a privilege and pleasure to participate in a symposium
dedicated to my distinguished friend and colleague, Jim Cox. I have
always been in awe of Jim’s prodigious scholarship and the reputation
he has rightly earned as the nation’s leading market-regulation
authority. Jim’s concern for the victims of market misconduct has been
persistent and forceful, perhaps even at the cost of opportunities that
might have brought him greater financial reward and political prestige.
I can only hope that my somewhat perverse approach to the problem
of bank failures does not disappoint him for being insufficiently
aggressive toward bankers and the banking markets. I know his
friendship would never allow him to show that disappointment, even if
he felt it.
INTRODUCTION
In the lingering aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, popular
anger about the damage wrought on the economy and individual
welfare still simmers.1 This anger visibly flared up again in the 2016
presidential election process.2 Financial companies, particularly as

1. The continuing level of public anger is quite remarkable. Five years after the 2008 crisis,
reports of this anger were quite commonplace. See, e.g., Michael Erman, Five Years After
Lehman, Americans Still Angry at Wall Street: Reuters/Ipsos Poll, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wallstreet-crisis-idUSBRE98E06Q20130915 [https://perma.cc/
682M-RA3S] (summarizing the results of an extensive poll of public opinion). Yet even in the
2016 presidential election, the impact of the 2008 crisis continued to loom large, and reform
proposals thought to be necessary were important policies on the agenda of both presidential
nominees and even played a role in the polarization of politics abroad. See, e.g., Victoria Stilwell
& Sarah McGregor, Angry Americans: How the 2008 Crash Fueled a Political Rebellion,
BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Mar. 1, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/
2016-03-01/the-angry-americans-trump-sanders-and-the-aftershocks-of-2008 [https://perma.cc/
L5TQ-682H] (discussing the impact of this anger on presidential campaign platforms); Amir Sufi,
Thank the Financial Crisis for Today’s Partisan Politics, EDUC. POST (July 15, 2016),
http://www.educationpost.com.hk/resources/mba/160715-mba-insights-thank-the-financial-crisisfor-today-s-partisan-politics [https://perma.cc/ZCJ4-WX2D] (discussing the dynamics of anger
directed at the 2008 crisis and how this anger has led to deep political polarization).
2. President-elect Donald Trump and the Republican Party platform added a call for
restoring the divide between commercial and investment banking, to the consternation of big
finance supporters within the Republican Party. See, e.g., Donna Borak, GOP Platform Calls for
Revival of Glass-Steagall, WALL STREET J. (July 19, 2016, 6:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/gop-platform-calls-for-revival-of-glass-steagall-1468876558 [https://perma.cc/NGY2-98
5D]. Then-nominee Hillary Clinton vowed to impose stricter regulation on big banks. See id. For
a survey of the political events leading to the insertion of a call for reform in the platforms for
both parties, see Pam Martens & Russ Martens, Both Democrat and Republican Platforms Have
Had It with Frankenbanks, WALL STREET ON PARADE (July 19, 2016), http://wallstreetonparade.
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embodied by big banks and Wall Street, are the primary objects of this
public fury. In this motif, bankers have become banksters and banks
have become too big to jail—even in the view of some judges and
commentators.3 Regulators have been excoriated for being captured or
at least asleep at the switch in their failure to prevent the 2008 crisis
and for bailing out some of the world’s biggest banks and other
financial companies.
The wreckage following the 2008 crisis is strewn with individual
and multiparty lawsuits and complex multigovernment and multiparty
settlements. Billions of dollars have been paid out by banks and other
financial companies as reparations for securities frauds and violations
of the federal False Claims Act.4 Yet successful private
class action suits5 against financial institutions have actually been few
and far between,6 and a majority of the crisis-related actions have
com/2016/07/both-democrat-and-republican-platforms-have-had-it-with-frankenbanks [https://
perma.cc/KBN5-5WG4].
3. One of the most prominent judicial critics is U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff. See, e.g.,
Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-noexecutive-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/M9S5-L7MZ]. Former federal prosecutor Bill Black has
waged a relentless attack on what he terms “banksters.” See, e.g., William K. Black, Hillary, the
Banksters Committed ‘Fraud,’ Not ‘Shenanigans,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 5, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-k-black/hillary-the-banksters-com_b_9164930.html
[https://perma.cc/UDZ6-4QWF].
4. A long string of enforcement actions against banks has developed in the aftermath of the
2008 crisis. Most prominent among these are fines for Libor violations and violations of tax
regulations and anti-money-laundering legislation. See, e.g., BSA-AML Civil Money Penalties,
BANKERSONLINE, https://www.bankersonline.com/penalty/penalty-type/bsa-aml-civil-moneypenalties [https://perma.cc/79VS-ACG9] (providing an ongoing record of Bank Secrecy Act and
Anti-money-laundering regulation violations by banks); Tracking the Libor Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 23, 2016, 8:49 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactice/
2015/04/23/business/dealbook/db-libor-timeline.html/#time370_10900
[https://perma.cc/K2L2PXUV] (providing ongoing reporting of the actions against banks and bankers for Libor
violations); Robert W. Wood, More Banks Spill Tax Evasion Secrets to Avoid Criminal
Charges,
Account
Holders
Beware,
FORBES
(Nov.
20,
2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/11/20/many-banks-avoid-u-s-tax-evasion-chargeshunt-for-americans-continues/#3e2627be1cc4 [https://perma.cc/F9FT-F274] (listing the many
banks that have been subject to enforcement actions for helping clients evade taxes).
5. For purposes of this Article, private class action suits and shareholder derivative suits are
treated as the same type of remedial pursuit.
6. For annual reports tracking and analyzing class action filings and settlements, including
those against financial-sector companies, see Securities Class Action Clearinghouse: A
Collaboration with Cornerstone Research, STANFORD LAW SCH. & CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
http://securities.stanford.edu [https://perma.cc/2QTL-XH35]. According to Clearinghouse data,
courts saw roughly two hundred class action filings between 2007 and 2011 involving claims
related to the credit crisis. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
FILINGS—2012 YEAR IN REVIEW 3 fig.2 (2013) (listing credit-crisis-related class actions over
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failed.7 Amid a perception that regulators and prosecutors are either
incapable of taking or unwilling to take sufficient remedial action to
punish financial miscreants and render victims of financial wrongs
whole, critics have suggested that private-attorney-general suits and
shareholder derivative suits might be the best complement to a
generally deficient enforcement regime.8
This potential solution to regulatory and prosecutorial
shortcomings has a facial attractiveness. Class action suits can often dig
where regulators have not gone or sometimes cannot go. Even the
extensive inspection powers of regulators might not always uncover
information secured in discovery and depositions. In the private
litigation tradition, such suits can build upon actual events and delve
further, subjecting a complex train of events leading to financial loss to
the rigor of discovery, trial, and the judgment of peers. Even when
settled before trial, such suits can not only secure reparations but also
time). The Clearinghouse analyses determined that “credit-crisis filings have significantly lower
settlement rates compared to non-credit-crisis filings.” CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION FILINGS—2010 YEAR IN REVIEW 6 (2011). And the group’s 2015 analysis
reported that credit-crisis-related filings have higher dismissal rates and slightly lower settlement
rates compared with class actions in general. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION FILINGS—2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 13 (2015).
7. The most prominent of these cases is FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 310
(4th Cir. 2015), discussed further in note 24 below. Very few 2008-crisis-related class action
lawsuits appear to have survived dismissal motions, reached a jury, or even been settled. One case
reached a jury verdict, leading to a partial award in the plaintiffs’ favor, but this verdict was
subsequently set aside by the Eleventh Circuit for absence of evidence indicating that losses were
caused by securities fraud and not the overall market conditions leading to the 2008 crisis.
Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 730 (11th Cir. 2012). See generally, e.g.,
Christopher J. Miller, “Don’t Blame Me, Blame the Financial Crisis”: A Survey of Dismissal
Rulings in 10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (2011) (observing
that the very fact of the 2008 crisis has made it more difficult to be successful in financial securities
fraud suits because losses can be attributed to economic conditions broader than those over which
the defendants have control).
8. See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex
Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63 (2008) (arguing, in the context of securities regulation rather
than bank regulation, that securities class actions play a vital role in preventing regulatory power
from concentrating solely in corporate actors); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private
Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012) (advocating a
strengthening of the mechanisms of private class action litigation as an important supplement to
regulation in the modern administrative state); Melanie Gray, Vanessa Chandis & Kristen M.
Echemendia, Striking the Right Balance: Public Versus Private Enforcement Laws—What Will We
Learn from This Financial Meltdown?, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 449 (2010) (making the case that
private enforcement actions are a necessary complement to public regulation); Mark Klock,
Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to Expressly Provide for
Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 437
(2011) (advocating broader use of private-attorney-general suits to foster a stronger culture of
integrity and ethical conduct in the auditing profession).
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operate to shape future financial conduct. Being privately funded, class
action suits are neither dependent on government appropriations nor
susceptible to industry capture. These advantages appear to be as good
as confirmed by the hostility toward them on the part of industry
organizations.9 Thus, in an era of widespread regulatory failure, class
action suits seem to offer a private, ex post solution that might actually
function as the “dark matter” of regulation—perhaps overlooked, but
integral to the system.
Yet traditional bank regulation itself no longer offers a generally
effective way to prevent or diminish widespread financial collapse.
Although, as emphasized below, such regulation plays a continuing and
vital role in cabining financial institutions within accepted risk
frameworks, it has also become highly formalized. This is a
consequence of public and congressional anger during and after the
savings-and-loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s, in which regulatory
enforcement powers were intensified and a range of unsafe bank
activities were criminalized or made more easily actionable.10 The
formalization process, in turn, helped to promote a public view that
bank failures are usually the result of fraudulent activity, and this
transformation in opinion might have led some to the view that
shareholder derivative and class action suits should become important
elements in bank safety regulation.11 As this Article argues, such a view
is based on a mistaken understanding of most of the activities and
actions that lead to bank failure. In reality, effective bank supervision
and the prevention of bank failure involve a constant series of difficult
9. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS? (2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/
Securities_Class_Actions_Final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/US45-7PBB].
10. A series of major statutes were passed in the wake of the S&L crisis in the 1980s, the
failure of a number of national banks into the 1990s, and rising concerns about money laundering
by drug cartels, each of which in turn provided political momentum for increasing the intensity of
public regulation over financial institutions. These statutes, coupled with numerous implementing
regulations, were the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
(reorganizing the fragmented enforcement powers of the bank regulatory agencies and
substantially strengthening them); the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
(introducing the preemptive power of “prompt corrective action”); the Crime Control Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code)
(authorizing prejudgment assets attachments); and the Annunzio-Wylie Money-Laundering Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code) (adding
money laundering as the basis for regulator enforcement powers to remove bank officers and
directors).
11. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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judgments, much akin to the “business judgments” covered by the
business judgment rule,12 and failures in such decisionmaking very
seldom constitute actionable fraud. The ineffectiveness of private
enforcement actions such as shareholder derivative and class action
suits leaves open the question of how we might impose mechanisms for
avoiding or reducing the risk of serious financial failure. This Article
argues that public regulation cannot be replaced but should instead be
modernized, using the advances of technology (“RegTech”), to enable
regulators to keep up with the very rapid evolution of markets and
their underlying technological development.
I. WHY CLASS ACTION SUITS CAN PROVIDE ONLY LIMITED RELIEF
The class action–private-attorney-general model cannot perform
the functions some might expect of it. This is because that model is
based on a framework directed at market misconduct, a framework
that is both unsuitable to and incapable of influencing bank
performance in ways that really would prevent bank failure and serious
consequential losses to customers, clients, taxpayers, and the general
public. The private-attorney-general model, in which securities-fraud
and shareholder-derivative-suit litigants provide ex post retribution for
failures in financial decisions, cannot address what is necessary to avoid
or at least minimize the consequences of bank failure or emergency
bank bailouts. Not only is such litigation ex post, taking place long after
the disaster has occurred, it is also focused on specific institutions and
not the overall systemic role of financial institutions.13 Avoiding the
consequences of bank failures can only be achieved by a combination
of real market discipline and either adequate bank regulation or a
massive restructuring encompassing the financial industry and perhaps
the entire economic system—if such avoidance is attainable at all.
Economic markets, financial and otherwise, are complex systems that
are not well reformed by sporadic, ad hoc litigation.

12. See infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
13. The nature of shareholder derivative and private-attorney-general suits is that they are
ex post: as a fundamental standing requirement, they can only take place after the damage has
occurred.

BAXTER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

ADAPTIVE FINANCIAL REGULATION

11/28/2016 2:42 PM

573

A. Nature of Financial Markets
Financial markets are inherently dynamic and volatile.14 Existing
in a state of constant and rapid revolution, they are quintessential
complex adaptive systems.15 The inherently volatile nature of financial
markets is primarily attributable to their position at the center of a web
of interconnected markets. National and global banking markets are
intertwined, not only with each other but also with a far-flung,
convoluted, and even more labile “shadow banking system” that itself
forms many different boundaries and textures in different parts of the
great global market.
Banks are also intimately connected with governments,
themselves subject to rapidly changing political preferences. Banks are
important participants in the huge government-debt market.16 They are
14. Santa Fe Institute Economist W. Brian Arthur states this well: “The economy is a vast
and complicated set of arrangements and actions wherein agents . . . buy and sell, speculate, trade,
oversee, bring products into being, offer services, invest in companies, strategize, explore,
forecast, compete, learn, innovate, and adapt. [This represents] a massively parallel system of
concurrent behavior.” W. BRIAN ARTHUR, COMPLEXITY AND THE ECONOMY 2–3 (2015). Such
understanding of financial markets is now commonplace, with vast swaths of academic and
scientific writing addressing the complex adaptive nature of these markets. Complexity science is
now gaining a strong foothold, even in official thinking about how markets should be regulated.
See, e.g., Nicholas Albertini, The US Treasury OFR and CFPB: A Paradigm Shift to Complexity
Economics, OPEDNEWS (Mar. 11, 2012, 8:14 AM), http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-USTreasury-OFR-and-CF-by-Nicholas-Albertini-120307-137.html [https://perma.cc/8PPY-MXSS]
(reporting on the adoption of complexity-science thinking by key financial regulators in the U.S.
federal government); U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: AN
ULTRA-LARGE-SCALE
SYSTEMS
PERSPECTIVE
7−12
(2011),
https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/289012/11-1223-dr4-global-financialmarkets-systems-perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/S39S-VHDE] (providing a U.K. government
analysis describing global financial markets as a complex “system-of-systems” (emphasis
omitted)).
15. The pioneering work by Arthur and others at the Santa Fe Institute stands out in helping
us understand economic markets as complex adaptive systems possessing the features of
dynamism, power laws and fragility, network codependence, and contagion. See, e.g., ARTHUR,
supra note 14, at 1–29 (explaining the “complexity economics” approach); Lawrence G. Baxter,
Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance,
31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 852–68 (2012) (outlining the features of complexity science and
the extensive literature on this subject). For some accessible and leading thinking on the
application of complexity science to bank regulation, see generally Stefano Battiston, J. Doyne
Farmer, Andreas Flache, Diego Garlaschelli, Andrew G. Haldane, Hans Heesterbeek, Cars
Hommes, Carlo Jaeger, Robert May & Marten Scheffer, Complexity Theory and Financial
Regulation, 351 SCIENCE 818 (2016); Andrew G. Haldane & Robert M. May, Systemic Risk in
Banking Ecosystems, 469 NATURE 351 (2011).
16. When serving as “primary dealers,” the trading counterparties of governments in their
implementation of monetary policies, see Primary Dealers List, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_current.html [https://perma.cc/R35F-QP85],
banks around the world create the very markets that buy the debts that governments issue. See
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key elements in the management of the money supply and the
provision of liquidity in international, national, and local economies.17
For example, banks are central to the implementation of national
housing policy18 and indispensable to government when a large
financial institution has to be rescued. Notwithstanding the popular
belief that they are “private” entities, in many important respects
banks are “instrumentalities of the state” and very salient, tangible
extensions of the sovereign.19
Our models of regulation and private litigation, however, fail to
address this market reality. We aspire to the ideals of the rule of law,
which, in the expectations of many participants in the financial
markets, are interpreted as requiring a framework of bright-line rules
and prohibitions stipulated in advance as the “rules of the game.”
These rules and prohibitions provide the basis for regulatory
enforcement actions and private litigation. Yet there is nothing
“bright-line” about financial markets, at least beyond evanescent
moments, nor has there ever been. The participants in financial
markets consist of a wide array of individuals and institutions who
are—even with the best of intentions—still strategic agents. They
constantly adapt to rules in a giant and continuous revelation of
“Goodhart’s Law,” which articulates the ephemeral nature of any form

generally, e.g., Marco Arnone & George Iden, Primary Dealers in Government Securities: Policy
Issues and Selected Countries’ Experience (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/03/45, 2003),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0345.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK2Y-YX3T]
(detailing how a primary-dealer system operates and cataloguing the primary-dealer systems of
various nations).
17. See, e.g., Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, Banks as Liquidity
Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking, 57 J. FIN. 33, 33−35
(2002).
18. In the United States, for example, national housing policy, which is designed to promote
home ownership, is heavily dependent on the interaction between banks and the governmentsponsored enterprises that provide the guarantees supporting asset securitization. See generally,
e.g., Nicola Cetorelli & Stavros Peristiani, The Role of Banks in Asset Securitization, FRBNY
ECON. POL’Y REV., July 2012, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/
epr/12v18n2/1207peri.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2P4-37RE] (describing “the principal roles in
securitization”).
19. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 15, at 818–25.
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of “target regulation.”20 Anticipatory or prophylactic command-andcontrol regulation quickly falls out of sync with market reality.21
Private ex post lawsuits, based on violations of law and probable
legal standards, must demonstrate causes of action that point to
relatively clear breaches of law, such as fraud or statutory violations. A
reversal by the Second Circuit of civil fraud awards entered against
Bank of America, N.A.; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.; and
Countrywide Bank, FSB demonstrates how very difficult it is to obtain
a determination of fraud in financial suits.22 Exacting standards for
proving intent to commit fraud apply, and these standards are almost
never met.23 Even where intent can be pinpointed within the
organization, in attempting to meet such standards of proof, fraud suits
also cannot prevail in the face of the business judgment rule, which
respects the fact that market participants must exercise discretionary

20. Goodhart’s Law has acquired this name in reference to an observation by London School
of Economics economist Charles Goodhart that target regulation is inherently self-defeating
because strategic action will be taken to work around the targets. For an analysis of the operation
of Goodhart’s Law, see generally K. Alec Chrystal & Paul D. Mizen, Goodhart’s Law: Its Origins,
Meaning and Implications for Monetary Policy (Nov. 12, 2001) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.cyberlibris.typepad.com/blog/files/Goodharts_Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8H3-TD
MC].
21. Market discipline, the theory that market participants indirectly “police” each other
when they act in their own interests, helps to keep these rapidly evolving markets rational.
However, the market discipline theory also has its weaknesses, insofar as it depends on equal
bargaining power, complete information transparency, and an absence of fraud. Market
discipline, therefore, is reliant on effective regulation to be effective. For an example of the
shortcomings of market discipline, see generally David Min, Understanding the Failures of Market
Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1421 (2015). Market participants are also able to quickly “work
around” rules. See Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, Safer Ratios, Riskier Portfolios: Banks’
Response to Government Aid, 113 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 1–2, 20 (2014) (demonstrating that by making
subtle changes in their portfolios to increase the risks of specific assets, banks are able to increase
income while staying within regulatory guidelines, even though their resulting portfolios are much
riskier); Emily Flitter, Emails Show JPMorgan Tried to Flout Basel Rules: Senate, REUTERS (Mar.
14, 2013, 5:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-whale-basel-idUSBRE
92D19Y20130314 [https://perma.cc/T6WT-EXS2] (summarizing a Senate report that found that
the bank’s risk methodology was adjusted to achieve results contrary to the spirit of the regulatory
prohibitions).
22. United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 666 (2d
Cir. 2016), rev’g 83 F. Supp. 3d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In the trial court, the financial institutions
had been found liable by a jury for mail and wire fraud under an explicit statutory provision in
FIRREA § 951, 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012). Id. at 653–55. For more examples of cases bolstering
the complaint that banks and their executives are not held accountable, see supra note 7.
23. See Countrywide, 822 F.3d at 656–66 (detailing the extensive evidentiary requirements
for both common law and statutory fraud, as well as the insufficiency of the government’s proof
in the case).
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judgment in the face of constantly evolving circumstances.24 For
example, a court recently explained that “corporations are expected to
take risks and their directors and officers are entitled to protection
from the business judgment rule when those risks turn out poorly.”25
Where “defendants do not display a conscious indifference to risks and
where there is no evidence to suggest that they did not have an honest
belief that their decisions were made in the company’s best interests,
then the business judgment rule applies even if those judgments
ultimately turned out to be poor.”26 But it is defaults of business
judgments, not fraud, that are almost always the most important when
large individual institutions fail, particularly when these institutions are
caught in the vortex of a systemic crisis.27 Such institutions are usually
able to withstand episodic frauds as long as they are not sufficiently
massive to destroy enough capital to plunge the institution into
bankruptcy, as occurred in the failure of Barings Bank in 1995.28

24. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974) (discussing the presumption
of bona fides on the part of directors). A recent case, FDIC ex rel. Cooperative Bank v. Willetts,
although later partially vacated by the Fourth Circuit based on a different reading of the rule,
illustrates the business judgment rule’s power. The court noted:
Cooperative’s pursuit of the challenged loans was in furtherance of Cooperative’s goal
to grow to a $1 billion institution and stay competitive with other regional and national
banks making substantial inroads into its territory. . . . The record can simply not
support a finding that the defendants’ business purpose fell so far beyond lucid
behavior that it could not even be considered “rational.” Although there were clearly
risks involved in Cooperative’s approach, the mere existence of risks cannot be said, in
hindsight, to constitute irrationality.
FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Willetts, 48 F. Supp. 3d 844, 851 (E.D.N.C. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, vacated in part sub nom. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2015).
Willetts was partly vacated by the Fourth Circuit on evidentiary grounds. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 314.
For a discussion of the similar hurdles faced by shareholder-derivative-suit litigants attempting to
seek recompense for excessive executive compensation, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 309, 2016). See also, e.g., Cent. Laborers’
Pension Fund ex rel. JPMorgan Chase & Co. v. Dimon, 638 Fed. App’x 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2016)
(discussing the protections afforded to directors taking good-faith actions, irrespective of how illadvised those actions may have been).
25. Willetts, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 851 (emphasis added).
26. Id. (citing State v. Custard, No. 06-CVS-4622, 2010 WL 1035809, at *22–23 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Mar. 19, 2010)).
27. As Professor Samuel Buell has observed in his work on the difficulties of holding firms
and their employees accountable for fraud in the criminal context, “[t]he lines can be very fine
between ordinary commerce and criminal wrongdoing.” SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL
OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 40 (2016).
28. Trader Nick Leeson placed wrong-way bets in an attempt to recover trading losses,
inflicting such great losses over a few weeks (more than £800 million) that his bank, Barings,
collapsed and had to be sold by the Bank of England to ING. For an example of a recent review
of this spectacular episode of fraud, see James Titcomb, Barings: The Collapse That Erased 232

BAXTER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

ADAPTIVE FINANCIAL REGULATION

11/28/2016 2:42 PM

577

B. Traditional Banking Regulation
This is not to say that regulation therefore must also fail. For the
entire period of bank regulation, the factor that has rendered
prophylactic command-and-control regulation effective, or even
possible at all, is discretion. Banking regulators wield large swaths of
discretion in ways that are largely invisible to the public. For example,
they are constantly monitoring loan-loss provisions by individual
institutions and assessing whether these provisions are realistic in light
of fluctuating economic conditions. They assess the adequacy of bank
capital levels on an ongoing basis and evaluate whether these levels are
sufficient in light of the portfolios of the specific institutions in question
and the particular events and conditions they face—events and
conditions that perpetually change as markets and external events
change.29 Apart from the amorphous nature of the phenomena that
must be taken into account, it is also true that there have very seldom
been sufficiently clear breaches of law for private suits to prevail.
Where private suits have been successful, there have been provable
breaches of clearly defined or well-settled law.30

Years of History, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11427501/Barings-the-collapse-that-erased-232-years-ofhistory.html [https://perma.cc/U4DZ-5WSC].
29. Regulators maintain hundreds of full-time staff (field examiners) who work permanently
on-site at most, if not all, of the big banks, and these supervisors spend their days ensuring, as far
as they can, that banks comply with regulatory guidelines and rules. For an outline of the process,
and the difference between regulation and supervision, see Thomas Eisenbach, David Lucca &
Robert Townsend, The Economics of Bank Supervision: So Much to Do, So Little Time, FED.
RES. BANK OF N.Y.: LIBERTY STREET ECON. (Apr. 12, 2016), http://libertystreeteconomics.
newyorkfed.org/2016/04/the-economics-of-bank-supervision-so-much-to-do-so-little-time.html
[https://perma.cc/C782-D76U]. See also, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, The Regulator Down the Hall: Fed
and Comptroller of the Currency Bolster the Banks of Staffers ‘Embedded’ at Nation’s Biggest
Banks, WALL STREET J. (June 20, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702
304763704576394610591065334 [https://perma.cc/PW8M-92FE] (providing both statistics and an
illustrative graphic on the prevalence of this practice). Banks also have to file a wide range of
reports on their activities, and these are monitored remotely for discrepancies and
noncompliance. One example is the currency transaction report that must be filed whenever a
payment transaction for more than $10,000 is made by a customer on any one business day; these
reports are filed electronically and monitored by a federal government agency looking primarily
for signs of criminality such as money laundering. See, e.g., Currency Transaction Reporting–
Overview, FED. FIN. INST. EXAM. COUNCIL: BANK SECRECY ACT/MONEY-LAUNDERING
INFOBASE
(2014),
https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_017.htm
[https://perma.cc/5G96-G99Q].
30. Nearly all suits are settled before trial, so the exact concessions by defendants are not
usually disclosed, but for the suits to be brought at all they have to be based on some kind of
alleged securities fraud. For example, JPMorgan Chase & Co. paid $4.5 billion to settle mortgage
claims brought against it by a group of investors who alleged that JPMorgan’s misrepresentations
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The banking regulators are engaged with the industries they
oversee in ways that are much deeper and more interactive than is the
case with most other types of regulators.31 They continuously monitor
and supervise their charges, quite literally on a daily and even hourly
basis, even evaluating the strategic business decisions made by a bank’s
management.32 The authority that bank regulators wield is part of the
quid pro quo for banks to receive certain benefits, including
participation in the depositor guarantee system that we call federal
deposit insurance (all banks), the benefits of a national charter
(national banks), and the security of membership in the Federal
Reserve (state member banks and all national banks). The bank
regulators possess and exercise extensive chartering, visitation, and
enforcement powers that require them to condition, observe, react to,
and nudge daily bank operations.
One of the primary missions of a bank regulator is to prevent bank
failure. This is known as “safety-and-soundness” supervision. Banks
considered to be acting in unsafe or unsound ways, as well as those that
have lapsed into conditions that are unsafe or unsound, are subject to
intense scrutiny by government regulators. Banks constantly modify
their operations in reaction to regulatory supervision and formal
examinations. In the rare cases where they do not respond
appropriately, recalcitrants are subject to the regulators’ vigorous and
very extensive enforcement powers.

had caused them to buy instruments whose risks were not properly disclosed (that is, fraud). See
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, For JPMorgan, $4.5 Billion to Settle Mortgage Claims, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Nov. 15, 2013, 6:20 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/jpmorganreaches-4-5-billion-settlement-with-investors [https://perma.cc/2Y4N-67Z3].
31. Market-conduct regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) also have some “prudential” regulatory responsibilities, but these are much less
significant than those discharged by the primary bank regulators. For an explanation of the broad
visitorial powers of federal bank examiners, see infra note 34.
32. For a typical example of the kinds of factors taken into account by regulators, such as the
ongoing concerns of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regarding strategic
risks and other risks undertaken by banks, see generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, SEMIANNUAL RISK PERSPECTIVE FROM THE NATIONAL RISK COMMITTEE (Spring
2016), http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/semi
annual-risk-perspective/semiannual-risk-perspective-spring-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMP79NNJ]. Since the S&L crisis, regulators have become much more intrusive in their assessments of
managerial decisions by banks. See generally Lawrence G. Baxter, The Rule of Too Much Law?
The New Safety/Soundness Rulemaking Responsibilities of the Federal Banking Agencies, 47
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 210 (1993) (describing how intrusive the regulations promulgated in
the wake of the S&L crisis had become).
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This system was most memorably described by Justice Brennan in
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,33 one of the great classics
involving bank antitrust law. Justice Brennan viewed the system as a
remarkable example of close interaction between the banks and the
regulators who maintained the constant supervision of the banks and
the health of the banking system.34
Notwithstanding the skepticism expressed so often nowadays, this
system of supervisory regulation has, if anything, become significantly
more intense. Large banks house hundreds of examiners from the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Reserve on their
premises, and a good deal of the monitoring takes place remotely via
automated reporting, the filing of call and periodic reports, and
information sharing among different regulatory agencies.35
II. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION VERSUS MARKETCONDUCT REGULATION
Banks, in other words, are not only subject to the requirement that
they abide by the law in these markets; they are also subject to
33. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
34. See id. at 329–30. Justice Brennan wrote:
[P]erhaps the most effective weapon of federal regulation of banking is the broad
visitorial power of federal bank examiners. Whenever the agencies deem it necessary,
they may order “a thorough examination of all the affairs of the bank,” whether it be a
member of the [Federal Reserve] or a nonmember insured bank. Such examinations
are frequent and intensive. In addition, the banks are required to furnish detailed
periodic reports of their operations to the supervisory agencies. In this way the agencies
maintain virtually a day-to-day surveillance of the American banking system. And
should they discover unsound banking practices, they are equipped with a formidable
array of sanctions. If in the judgment of the FRB [Federal Reserve Board] a member
bank is making “undue use of bank credit,” the Board may suspend the bank from the
use of the credit facilities of the FRS [Federal Reserve]. The FDIC has an even more
formidable power. If it finds “unsafe or unsound practices” in the conduct of the
business of any insured bank, it may terminate the bank’s insured status. Such
involuntary termination severs the bank’s membership in the FRS [Federal Reserve],
if it is a state bank, and throws it into receivership if it is a national bank. . . . As a result
of the existence of this panoply of sanctions, recommendations by the agencies
concerning banking practices tend to be followed by bankers without the necessity of
formal compliance proceedings.
Federal supervision of banking has been called “[p]robably the outstanding
example in the federal government of regulation of an entire industry through methods
of supervision. . . . The system may be one of the most successful [systems of economic
regulation], if not the most successful.” To the efficacy of this system we may owe, in
part, the virtual disappearance of bank failures from the American economic scene.
Id. (sixth and seventh alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting 12 U.S.C. § 325
(2012), then quoting 12 U.S.C. § 301, then quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a), then quoting 1 DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.04 (1958)).
35. See supra note 29.
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prudential regulation, which is distinct from (though often linked to)
market-conduct regulation. Prudential regulation focuses on the
wisdom of financial decisionmaking and management,36 while marketconduct regulation focuses on whether markets are fair and whether
participants are trying to cheat. Indeed, bank regulators are now
officially referred to as “prudential regulators” to distinguish them
from market regulators like the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).37
The convoluted legislative framework of financial regulation has
generated some exceptions to this distinction, but as a general rule the
distinction has become critical to modern banking regulation.
Safety-and-soundness regulation, however, introduces a unique
component into the banking business. Whereas it is generally assumed
that management, boards, and shareholders have a free hand in
business so long as they refrain from violating external constraints
expressed in laws and regulations, banks are monitored much more
continuously and closely. Banks’ actions are subject to persistent
scrutiny through the process of regulatory supervision of their
condition, their managers’ conduct, and even certain decisions that
might otherwise be thought of as business judgments.38 When banks
incline toward unsafe or unsound activities, or when they lapse into an
unsafe or unsound condition—for example, when a bank allows its
36. See generally Vincent P. Polizatto, Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision:
Building an Institutional Framework for Banks 2 n.4 (World Bank Pol’y, Planning, and Research
Complex, WPS 340, 1990), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/389501468764981235/
Prudential-regulation-and-banking-supervision-building-an-institutional-framework-for-Banks
[https://perma.cc/B6PP-2G7P] (“Prudential regulation refers to the set of laws, rules, and
regulations which is designed to minimize the risks banks assume and to ensure the safety and
soundness of both individual institutions and the system as a whole. Examples include lending
limits, minimum capital adequacy guidelines, liquidity ratios, etc.”); id. at 4 (“Prudential
regulations establish the outside limits and constraints placed on banks to ensure the safety and
soundness of the banking system. They are the key elements to prevent, limit or stop the damage
caused by poor management.”).
37. For example, the Commodity Exchange Act specifically defines “prudential regulator”
to encompass the banking regulators. Commodity Exchange Act § 1, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(39) (2012).
Section 6b-1 of the Act allocates exclusive enforcement authority for most bank derivatives
activities to the “prudential regulators,” id. § 6b-1, and other provisions of the Act provide for
special treatment by “prudential regulators” of banks’ swap activity and minimum capital and
margin variation requirements, id. §§ 6s(d)−(e), 6r.
38. In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA)
significantly extended the safety-and-soundness powers of the prudential regulators, to the point
that one might regard these powers as permitting regulators to intrude into the business
judgments of banking institutions. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1811). See generally, e.g., Baxter, supra note 32 (discussing the intrusive nature of
the FDICIA safety-and-soundness regulations).
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capital or funding levels to drop below the point where it can recover
from unexpected economic shocks or losses, or when a bank becomes
vulnerable to sectoral downturns after concentrating its lending too
heavily within a particular economic sector, as has been the case with
the oil market over the past few years39—it is the job of regulators to
nudge them back to soundness or, if these efforts are unsuccessful, to
take increasingly formal enforcement action. These measures
commonly occur throughout the life cycle of the bank.
Banks and their regulators are therefore locked in an interactive
embrace as business decisions unfold. This is perhaps one of the
reasons why “regulatory capture” assumes such significant dimensions
in debates concerning banks—regulators are so closely involved that it
often may be correct to assume that bank regulators are unduly
influenced by their protégés.40 This close involvement could also be the
reason for so much public and political ire toward regulators, whom we
instinctively feel should have prevented bank failure.
Yet it is this symbiotic relationship that renders bank mistakes so
difficult to condemn. Not only must a litigant overcome the business
judgment rule, which requires judicial deference toward management
decisions made in good faith, but often she must also deal with the fact
that much of what a bank has done has already been addressed and
even condoned by its regulators. To this extent, there is a whiff of
“indemnity” surrounding the actions of a bank.
Of course, this reality does not preempt condemnation of both
banks and regulators for failing to prevent financial disasters. It is
entirely understandable that we should accuse regulators of being
asleep at the switch, bamboozled, or even captured. Additionally, to
the extent that regulators cannot cover a substantial portion of bank
management decisionmaking, we can also accuse banks of deceptive
practices when not under the watchful eye of their supervisors, or
charge them with having pulled the wool over regulatory eyes. But the
39. See, e.g., Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. & Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/20151105a.htm [https://perma.cc/MF4X-JLQG] (expressing concern
regarding greater risks posed to banks by the collapse in oil prices).
40. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It
Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 187 (2011) (“[T]he highly
discretionary and continuous nature of bank regulation is dependent on and nurtures an
environment in which the regulators and the regulated are engaged in such close, daily
relationships as to nurture . . . codependence [that] might seem inevitably to lead to a mutual
identification of interests and a manifestation of deep, if not surface, capture.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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modality of safety-and-soundness supervision makes it extremely hard
to establish provable violations of law.
This environment of safety-and-soundness regulation—or, as this
is coming to be more commonly known, prudential regulation—should
be clearly understood. Such regulation involves close interaction
between banks and their supervisors, a constant series of difficult
judgments on the part of both bankers and regulators, and a complex
world of decisionmaking in which there is seldom one linear chain of
events leading to financial loss. This explains why ad hoc, ex post
private class action suits stand little chance of success in deterring bank
failures or providing compensation when failures occur. It is also, one
might submit, one of the reasons for public bewilderment at the lack of
prosecutions of bankers: the public perception of banker wrongdoing
likely tracks the market-conduct concept of “fraud” and
“lawbreaking,” and there were sufficient examples of such activities
taking place to help generalize the perception to all things that went
wrong with the banks and the financial system. The enforcement
actions taken by the SEC and the CFTC, as well as the few successful
class action suits, were both heavily based on concepts of market fraud,
and thus might have helped promote the view that far more
prosecutions ought to have been undertaken. In reality, actions based
on variants of fraud might well have probed the outer limits of fruitful
litigation.
III. DYNAMIC AND ADAPTIVE REGULATION
If traditional legal methods of reparation are inadequate, we are
then left with the problem of preventing widespread banking failure
and the damage such failure wreaks on interconnected institutions, the
public, and the economy in general. The policy answers range from one
extreme (pure market discipline) to the other (tight regulatory
discipline or control). As a society, we have tended to choose a position
somewhere in between. Yet we now find that this choice—a
combination of market discipline and regulatory discipline—is hotly
contested. Whereas for most of the period from the Banking Act of
1933 to the 2008 crisis the overall compromise between market and
regulatory discipline had seemed reasonably satisfactory, the view that
market and regulatory failures had “caused” the 2008 crisis led to two
nearly irreconcilable solutions. One argued for intensified-market
conduct, prudential regulation of individual financial institutions and
general financial stability regulation, which are each among the major
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principles embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act.41 The alternative
advocated further deregulation, and was promoted by those who
argued that faulty government intervention was the problem in the first
place.42
Only the most extreme proponents of pure market discipline
would take the view that government regulation has very little role to
play.43 Even leading bankers believe that the financial markets cannot
operate properly without some degree of government regulation.44 So,
except where reduced to the level of the reality television of the 2016
presidential campaigns, the debates center around the degree of
regulation, its cost, and how much of it is effective or, alternatively,
counterproductive. Regulators and the adherents of intensified
regulation rightly point out that for the stricter regulatory agenda to
work, regulators need to be better resourced. Yet opponents of current
and any increased levels of regulation point to many areas in which this
regulation might be ineffective, counterproductive, or smothering in its
compliance requirements. Nowhere does this seem to be more true
than in the case of smaller banks, which lack the resources required to
41. The intensification of prudential regulation was the central objective of Title I of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code). Dodd-Frank mandated a host of
regulations designed to impose much closer scrutiny over banks by regulators. For a review of the
numerous regulations mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act and progress in their implementation,
see DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT (2016), https://www.
davispolk.com/publications/dodd-frank-progress-report-six-year-anniversary [https://perma.cc/
84SZ-UXKZ].
42. See, e.g., JOHN A. ALLISON, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FREE MARKET CURE:
WHY PURE CAPITALISM IS THE WORLD’S ONLY HOPE (2012). Examples of government failures
that are often cited are market distortions created by national housing policy; moral hazard
associated with overbroad depositor protection; and monetary policies promoted by the Federal
Reserve, such as unrealistically low interest rates, that led to the buildup of risk in the financial
system and eventually to bubbles and crises.
43. After the 2008 crisis, a majority of the American public believes that we should regulate
banks more, not less. See, e.g., THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS,
AUTO BAILOUT NOW BACKED, STIMULUS DIVISIVE 4 (2012) (indicating levels of support for
current, less, and more regulation of banks). Underlying this aversion to governmental regulation
is the strong belief that market discipline tends to be more effective. See, e.g., John A. Allison,
Market Discipline Beats Regulatory Discipline, 34 CATO J. 345, 345–48 (2014) (expressing
skepticism at the intentions and effectiveness of governmental regulation of banks).
44. See, e.g., Letter from Jamie Dimon, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, JPMorgan Chase
& Co., to Shareholders 46 (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investorrelations/document/ar2015-ceolettershareholders.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2DQ-2QKC] (“By any
reasonable measure, the financial system is unquestionably stronger [since the 2008 crisis], and
regulators deserve a lot of credit for this. . . . Some people speak of regulation like it is a simple,
binary tradeoff . . . . We believe that many times you can come up with regulations that . . . create
a stronger system and enhance growth”).
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develop and maintain compliance platforms that can cope with the new
regulatory regimes erected by the regulators in the wake of the passage
of the Dodd-Frank Act.45
There is an even greater underlying problem that renders publicpolicy debates about better financial regulation somewhat sterile. We
use models that have to some extent worked in the past in the
traditional arena of market-conduct regulation, such as enforcing
against easily proven violations of prophylactic rules stipulated in
advance for appropriate market behavior. Yet this model has not had
central relevance to the important mission of maintaining and
promoting safe and sound conduct, as opposed to policing lawbreaking,
which is essential for preserving the prosperity and stability of banking.
It is true that banks are occasionally brought down by outright fraud or
conduct so reckless that it is easily considered a violation of the
rules—Barings Bank, destroyed by the bets placed by Nicholas Leeson,
always comes to mind.46 But the majority of financial difficulties caused
by banks, or in which banks find themselves ensnared, are the result of
a variety of factors other than fraud: bad business judgment (leading to
unsafe and unsound financial conditions or conduct); sudden and
unexpected “endogenous” events such as the collapse of certain
industrial sectors (energy) or badly managed switches in central
banking policy (for example, delinking the Swiss franc, Chinese
government reversals in recent months, and the failure by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to raise interest rates at the
proper time in the buildup to the 2008 crisis); major “macro trends”
(for
example,
long-term
interest-margin
squeezes
and
disintermediation by nonbanks); and the surges of boom-and-bust
cycles that banks find themselves unable to resist.47 These are all
features of the complex adaptive nature of financial markets, which are

45. See, e.g., Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, The State and Fate of Community Banking
21−25 (Harv. Kennedy School Mossavar-Rahmi Ctr. for Bus. and Gov’t, Working Paper No. 37,
2015), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/74695/1687293/version/1/file/Final_State_
and_Fate_Lux_Greene.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PTF-44R7] (presenting an extensive economic
study which found that regulatory burdens are falling particularly harshly on smaller banks).
46. On the Barings Bank collapse, see generally STEPHEN FAY, THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS
(1996). See also supra note 28.
47. The author of this Article is an adherent of the views of the late Hyman Minsky, who
developed the “Instability Hypothesis” that demonstrates why boom-and-bust cycles are inherent
to financial markets. Among Minsky’s extensive work, the following is an excellent example of
his contribution to the field: Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Jerome Levy
Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 74, 1992), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/
wp74.pdf [https://perma.cc/X68V-C492].

BAXTER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

ADAPTIVE FINANCIAL REGULATION

11/28/2016 2:42 PM

585

themselves constantly labile and dynamic. Such features have always
been inherent in financial markets.
If the markets inherently possess characteristics of complexity and
dynamism, it is interesting that we only reached the point of bitter
controversy over the past couple of decades. This Article presupposes
that the reason for this recent discontent is that the major
disagreements on bank regulatory policy are rooted in the buildup of
formalism in enforcement powers and regulator–bank relationships,
which began in reaction to the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Up to that point,
banking regulators were able to interact with the financial markets and
industries they regulated in a fairly dynamic and adaptive way. Safetyand-soundness regulation was highly discretionary, as banks operated
within a relatively definable structure created by the banking
legislation of the 1930s.48 The notion of minimum capital itself only
became a significant regulatory principle in the early 1980s.49
Furthermore, banks were small enough, and their activities simple
enough, for the task of “manual” supervisory regulation to be
adequately staffed and discharged by the banking regulators.
As the scandals unearthed by the S&L crisis exploded in the late
1980s, it became apparent that all kinds of excesses had been permitted
to savings-and-loan institutions by regulators who appeared
underpowered, docile or complacent, or captured—in some cases all
three.50 Public anger at what was thought at the time to be a very

48. The parent statute for the major banking reforms of the New Deal was the Banking Act
of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. This statute introduced reforms such as federal deposit insurance, the
Glass-Steagall wall between commercial and investment banking, and increased powers for
regulators to enforce bank safety-and-soundness regulations. See id. For a convenient history, see
Julia Maues, Banking Act of 1933, Commonly Called Glass-Steagall, FED. RES. HISTORY (Nov.
22, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/25 [https://perma.cc/DK2PDSHC].
49. For example, the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97
Stat. 1278 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901−3911 (2012)), was partially enacted in
response to a Fifth Circuit ruling that regulatory imposition of minimum capital requirements
went beyond the regulator’s powers. See First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the
Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 687 (5th Cir. 1983).
50. Vivid expressions of congressional dissatisfaction with the performance of the regulators
occurred during both the S&L crisis and the 2008 crisis. In 1989, Congress abolished the old
Federal Home Loan Bank Board and its deposit insurance arm, supplanting the regulatory
functions over thrift institutions into a new agency within the Treasury Department called the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the insurance functions within the FDIC. See The S&L
Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/
sandl/ [https://perma.cc/P44N-H9R9] (offering a chronology of events during the S&L crisis and
the legislative aftermath). The continuing ineffectiveness of the OTS, particularly in its failure to
provide adequate supervision over the thrift subsidiary of AIG, led to its own abolition and the
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sizeable bailout led to strong reactions in Congress, which passed a
succession of statutes that intensified and formalized the enforcement
powers of the banking regulators and also criminalized many more
financial activities.51
Although this reaction might have been politically appropriate, it
had the effect of formalizing the relationship between regulators and
the industry. What had long been a flexible and deliberative
relationship between banks and their regulators, very seldom rising to
the level of actual enforcement action against a bank and almost never
becoming a public issue, became one in which regulators possessed and
in some cases were specifically required to exercise very far-reaching
powers. Many bank executives were sent to federal prison,52 and the
overall regulatory modus vivendi acquired a stronger adversarial tinge.
To a certain extent, regulatory discretion has become a notion
deeply mistrusted in a Congress to which the regulators must in turn
answer if anything goes wrong.53 These trends, combined with various

transfer of its functions to the OCC under the Dodd-Frank Act. For a chronology of events during
the 2008 crisis and the legislative aftermath, see Events, FED. RESERVE HISTORY,
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/Graphicalview/15 [http://perma.cc/5J45-2HEP] and
the links cited therein.
51. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811
(2012)); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (including PCA);
Annunzio-Wylie Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47, 49, 50 U.S.C.). The Dodd-Frank
Act further extended the enforcement powers of the financial regulators. For example, the SEC
was given additional authority to impose civil money penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings,
Dodd-Frank § 929P (amending § 8A of the Securities Act, § 21B(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act, § 9(d)(1) of the Investment Company Act, and § 203(i)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act),
and the OCC was given extended visitorial powers over national banks by section 1047 of the
Dodd-Frank Act (amending § 5136C of the National Building Act).
52. See, e.g., Joshua Holland, Hundreds of Wall Street Execs Went to Prison During the Last
Fraud-Fueled Bank Crisis, MOYERS & CO. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://billmoyers.com/2013/09/17/
hundreds-of-wall-street-execs-went-to-prison-during-the-last-fraud-fueled-bank-crisis/ [https://
perma.cc/Y8F9-C724] (interviewing one of the leading prosecutors involved at the time).
53. A view of the supposed evils of regulatory discretion is held by some in the markets. For
example, see prominent blogger Steve Randy Waldman’s observation (accompanied by serious
argument) that “[an] enduring truth about financial regulation is this: [g]iven the discretion to do
so, financial regulators will always do the wrong thing.” Discretion and Financial Regulation,
INTERFLUIDITY (Nov. 16, 2009, 3:15 AM), http://www.interfluidity.com/posts/1258156478.shtml
[https://perma.cc/T4MC-GWGH]. Of course, the overall reasons for regulatory failure are much
more complex than an incapacity on the part of regulators to make good decisions. See generally,
e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN (2014) (explaining that deep
structural factors are to blame for government failure, rather than which party is in charge).
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economic misfortunes, have tended to pit industry and regulators
against each other—a model simply incompatible with the
requirements of ever-changing, fast-moving, and often volatile
markets. Moreover, the evolving adversarial model has demanded
resources on the part of the regulators, resources that Congress has
been reluctant to provide. For example, the SEC and the CFTC were
given a large range of new mandates to regulate the financial markets,54
yet their budgets were not correspondingly increased to match these
new demands.55 It is true that the prudential regulators largely fund
themselves through the fees imposed on their industries, but even
raising these imposts has served further to fracture cooperation
between regulators and their banks.
So we have drifted far from the kind of regulatory model that can
be productive and viewed in a positive light by both the industry and
the public. To regulate modern markets effectively, regulators must be
able to exercise broad discretion when deciding whether to intervene
to stop certain activities deemed potentially dangerous to the
institution in question. They require regulators who can keep pace with
the markets and apply meaningful, continuous supervision. And they
require sophisticated technology to match the demands of modern
banking. Simply prohibiting activities, a strategy that has been
advocated by those who blame “innovation” as a cause of the 2008

54. Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, Pub. L. No 11−203, 124 Stat. 1822
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 921 (2012)) (Dodd-Frank Act, Title IX) (conferring extensive new
enforcement powers on the SEC and the CFTC).
55. See, e.g., Stewart Bishop, GOP Senate Spells Tight Budgets for SEC, CFTC, LAW360
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/591224/gop-senate-spells-tight-budgets-for-seccftc [http://perma.cc/9C74-U4TZ] (describing the refusal of the Senate, then newly controlled by
the Republican Party, to provide adequate funding for the CFTC and the SEC); Richard Hill,
SEC, CFTC Funding Flat in Senate Bill, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 16, 2016), http://
www.bna.com/sec-cftc-funding-n57982074254 [https://perma.cc/9MZE-KZMD] (describing the
flat funding by the Senate Appropriations Committee for fiscal year 2017, despite White House
requests for increases to cope with new burdens imposed on these agencies). The CFPB has
received special treatment in that its budget has been tied to revenue derived by the Federal
Reserve. Nonetheless, the GOP-controlled Congress, with strong industry support, has
repeatedly tried to change this funding mechanism to reduce the amount of funding the CFPB
receives. For a recent example, see Ian McKendry, House Spending Bill Includes Big Changes to
CFPB, AM. BANKER (July 8, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/housespending-bill-includes-big-changes-to-cfpb-1090107-1.html
[http://perma.cc/G88M-5EWF]
(reporting on a spending bill approved by the House, which would fundamentally restructure the
CFPB and change its funding—interpreted by the opposition as an attack on the effectiveness of
the CFPB).
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crisis,56 is not an option: just as water will always find a way around
barriers, such innovation would simply move almost instantly to the
shadow banking arena, where there is even less supervision and an
even lesser chance of such supervision being effective.57 Finally,
structural reforms that would segregate segments of the financial
industry along the lines of the Glass-Steagall Act58 can only go so far in
preventing interconnections between these segments. The
interconnections themselves continue to require some kind of
supervision.59 What is required for effective prudential supervision is a
regulatory framework that is capable of rapid adaptation, that is
genuinely feasible in the hands of budget-constrained regulators, and
that automates data and compliance monitoring so that important
matters entailing expert discretionary judgment can be isolated,
subjected to dedicated regulatory assessment, and, where necessary,
subjected to further action.
We talk and act, however, in terms that do not fit this dynamic
nature of markets. We use and promote prophylactic rules that fail to
recognize the labile nature of matters that must be regulated. The
56. See, e.g., Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Finance: Before the Next Meltdown, 14 DEM. J.,
Fall 2009, http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/14/finance-before-the-next-meltdown [https://
perma.cc/3TY3-34F9] (“[F]inancial innovation stands accused of being complicit in the financial
crisis that has created the first global recession in decades.”). The literature on whether and how
financial innovation contributed to the 2008 crisis is vast. See, e.g., Thorsten Beck, Tao Che, Chen
Lin & Frank M. Song, Financial Innovation: The Bright and the Dark Sides (Jan. 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1991216&rec=1&srcabs=1986922&alg=1&p
os=5 [https://perma.cc/6QPS-WBA2].
57. Some scholars have attempted to develop a framework along the lines of the Food and
Drug Administration’s drug-approved process for approving “innovative” banking products. E.g.,
Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 90−93 (2012); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial
Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1348−56 (2013). These thoughtful attempts seem quaintly out of touch
with the nature of modern financial markets; they seem highly unlikely to be adopted by policy
makers, and the efforts to restrict innovation would likely project a similar departure to the
shadow markets.
58. The Glass-Steagall Act was a principal component of the Banking Act of 1933. Among
other provisions, four key sections (sections 16, 20, 21, and 32) severely restricted the ability of
banks to engage in securities underwriting, Banking Act of 1933 § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012),
forbade affiliation between commercial banks and investment banks, Banking Act of 1933 § 20,
48 Stat. 162 (repealed 1999); Banking Act of 1933 § 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378, and prohibited bank
directors and management from also performing such functions on investment banks, and vice
versa, Banking Act of 1933 § 32, 48 Stat. 162 (repealed 1999).
59. A prominent former regulator has made this point again very recently. See Eugene
Ludwig, Unregulated Shadow Banks Are a Ticking Time Bomb, AM. BANKER (Mar. 15, 2016),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/unregulated-shadow-banks-are-a-ticking-timebomb-1079892-1.html [https://perma.cc/RV5Z-Z3E2].
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circumstances facing financial institutions change constantly. When an
industrial sector suddenly encounters difficulties, the complexion of a
bank’s portfolio can change almost overnight. Without extensive
discretion, management (let alone regulators) cannot adapt quickly to
reposition and adjust. Except at the most abstract levels, it is difficult
to provide regulatory guidance in advance. Prophylactic rules quickly
become part of the problem themselves, either because they lose their
initial suitability to market conditions or because they are easily
circumvented to the extent that they form target regulation, around
which any rational actor would quickly adapt.60 It is said that “markets
demand certainty,” yet markets are never certain for long. We accuse
regulators of having “abdicated” their responsibilities by, for example,
validating bank risk models instead of creating their own direct
supervisory models.61 And new permutations of bankers and third
parties, using highly advanced algorithmic tools,62 are presenting even
greater challenges. These cannot be ignored by regulators, yet to
address the challenges such models present requires an entirely new
mindset and lab-like experimentation. If we continue to assume a
command-and-control model of regulation, we cannot hope to produce
a regulatory capacity capable of meeting the need for supervision and
oversight of modern financial markets. In short, we need to think in
terms of dynamic regulation when it comes to the safety of our financial
institutions and the stability of the financial system itself.
This is not to suggest that market-conduct regulation and victims’
market-conduct class action suits are ineffective or irrelevant. But such
mechanisms only police the miscreants of the market. Notwithstanding
emotive labels (“banksters,” for example), it seems reasonable to
60. For a discussion of Goodhart’s Law, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., IMAD A. MOOSA, THE MYTH OF TOO BIG TO FAIL 88 (2010) (suggesting that
regulators relied too heavily on the ratings agencies instead of making their own assessments);
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88
TEX. L. REV. 669, 677–78 (2010) (describing the difficulty of regulating financial risks); Baxter,
supra note 15, at 839–41 (describing the impact of regulatory reliance on bank risk-management
models); Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 129–34 (2009)
(arguing that regulatory reliance on bank risk modeling was in effect an abdication of regulatory
responsibility).
62. The field of algorithmic finance, which is essentially computer-driven financial activity,
is already vast, covering such fields as statistical arbitrage strategies, high-frequency trading,
agent-based finance, and machine learning. See, e.g., ALGORITHMIC FINANCE, http://algorithmic
finance.org [https://perma.cc/PY7S-BVRU]. The academic journal Algorithmic Finance is
devoted to publishing academic articles on the subject, and it maintains archives. See id. (follow
“archive on SSRN.com” hyperlink under “Archives” heading on right-side column).
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assume that most bankers, perhaps the vast majority, are trying to do
the right thing just like everybody else.63 Market-conduct defalcations
require punishment, not only to provide compensation to victims but
also to send signals to the market as to the boundaries of acceptable
conduct. Prudential regulation, however, is a very different enterprise
not easily amenable to or effective in the use of punitive tools, except
where market participants simply refuse to conform to reasonable
supervisory requirements. It is for these purposes that we must
continue to develop a more appropriate model of dynamic financial
regulation.
A. Avenues of Development
Notwithstanding the misgivings that many experts have about the
efficacy of the reforms introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act64 and the
many years of its subsequent regulatory implementation,65 a good case
can be made that the legislation and its regulations readjusted the focus
of government regulation in various desirable directions. Indeed, a
failure by regulators to make such adjustments is itself creating great
perils.66
First, the systemic framework within which the health of banks
and overall financial stability must be preserved has been elevated in
importance. Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act67 created a new Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and a research agency, the Office
of Financial Research (OFR).68 The purpose of these reforms was to

63. The shocking Wells Fargo fraud scandal, in which two million fraudulent accounts were
opened, five thousand employees were fired, and the CEO was forced to retire, might suggest
otherwise, yet even that example would seem to be the exception that proves the rule, and it
would certainly be wrong to accuse the large majority of Wells Fargo bankers of fraud. See, e.g.,
Renae Merie, Wells Fargo CEO Steps Down in Wake of Sham Accounts Scandal, WASH. POST
(Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/10/12/wells-fargo-ceoto-retire-in-wake-of-sham-accounts-scandal [https://perma.cc/RY62-MHXF] (reviewing the
scandal and its consequences).
64. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).
65. See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 41.
66. See Bamberger, supra note 61, at 677–97 (describing compliance’s dependence on
technology itself, which in turn creates all kinds of perils, effectively transferring monitoring and
the interpretation of compliance adequacy from regulators to programmers within the financial
institutions themselves).
67. Financial Stability Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5374 (2012).
68. Dodd-Frank § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (creating the FSOC); id. § 152, 12 U.S.C. § 5342
(creating the OFR). The Federal Reserve Board had also created a new committee called the
Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research (OFSPR), now the Division of Financial
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understand better the dynamics of the financial markets as a whole and
the areas from which instability might evolve. The FSOC has the power
to designate nonbank financial institutions, including financial-market
utilities such as exchanges and clearinghouses, as systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs), subject to increased capital and
other regulatory requirements.69 The statute itself also identifies a
whole class of big banks as systemically important banks (SIBs).70
Second, the Dodd-Frank Act intensified the level of regulation to
which SIFIs, bank holding companies, foreign banking organizations,
and nonbank SIFIs are now subject.71 The regulatory powers of the
prudential agencies, in particular the Federal Reserve, were
substantially enhanced so that macroprudential (systemic) and

Stability, to coordinate its significant research resources. These entities (the FSOC, OFR, and
OFSPR) are all designed to gather better economic data concerning potential areas of financial
instability, and to provide better analysis of what this data signifies and where the trends in
financial threats are heading. See, e.g., About the OFR, OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH,
https://financialresearch.gov/about/ [https://perma.cc/7KSP-ETKS] (describing and reporting on
the functions of the OFR); Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/UB3K-NF
Z9] (describing the structure and functions of the FSOC); The Economists: Financial Stability,
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/
fsprstaff.htm [https://perma.cc/6YPN-2PM6] (describing functions of and personnel in the
division).
69. The enhanced regulatory requirements are contained in Titles I and III of the DoddFrank Act. Section 165 of the Act requires the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate regulations
for enhanced prudential supervision, including the application of strict liquidity, risk
management, and capital standards, of and to large U.S. bank holding companies and foreign
banking organizations. Dodd-Frank Act § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365. These regulations were
promulgated in a final rule in early 2014. Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding
Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations (Regulation YY), 79 Fed. Reg. 17240 (codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252 (2015)); see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.
(Feb.
18,
2014),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140218a.htm
[https://perma.cc/EHY9-FWJV] (providing a convenient outline of the contents of the very
complex and lengthy rule). In addition to the enhanced regulation of large holding companies,
banks above a certain asset size are subject to direct enhanced regulation by their primary
regulators, for example the OCC. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 39, 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (2012)
(as amended by FDICIA, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 132, 105 Stat. 2236, 2267–2270). For the OCC’s
rules, see OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 2014-45,
HEIGHTENED STANDARDS FOR LARGE BANKS: INTEGRATION OF 12 CFR 30 AND 12 CFR 170
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2014/bulletin-2014-45.html
[https://perma.cc/FF33-C9VQ].
70. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(a)–(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)–(b) (requiring more stringent
standards of supervision for banks and bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of
$50 billion or more).
71. Id. §§ 161–176 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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microprudential (safety-and-soundness)72 issues are under more
comprehensive surveillance by the banking regulators.
Finally, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve were given much more
extensive powers over banking organizations and, potentially,
nonbanking organizations. They may now require forward planning on
the part of these organizations for situations of instability and possible
eventual failure (“orderly resolution plans” or “living wills”), and they
may also require rapid resolution in the event of failure on the part of
a particular financial institution.73
Reforms were also directed toward market conduct and the
visibility of market activities. Among many other reforms, the SEC and
the CFTC obtained extensive new powers to regulate the over-thecounter derivatives market and its key institutions,74 while the newly
created CFPB75 acquired extensive powers to regulate “unfair,
deceptive, or abusive” financial practices involving consumers.76 These
reforms, involving better disclosures, tighter rules regarding
counterparties and borrowers, and much more extensive reporting, are
significant extensions of the general and long-standing principles of
market regulation. Apart from violations of the relevant laws and
regulations, however, the extended framework of market regulation
continues to be aimed at market abuse, not preventing the failure of
the financial system itself.
All of the measures just described—systemic-risk regulation,
enhanced regulation of individual institutions, and market
transparency and fairness regulation—were designed to strengthen

72. Macroprudential regulation focuses on the systemic elements of financial stability: for
example, how financial institutions interact with each other, how macroeconomic trends affect
the stability of financial institutions, and how financial institutions can affect overall financial
stability. Microprudential regulation focuses on the soundness, management, and financial health
of individual institutions.
73. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 201–217 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394).
74. Id. §§ 701–74 (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.).
75. Id. §§ 1001–1100H (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). The supervision
and minimum requirements of many banking activities were also substantially strengthened,
including: investing, id. §§ 901–91 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code), engagement
with private equity and hedge funds, id. § 619 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 and known as the
“Volcker Rule”), and granting mortgages, id. §§ 1400–1498 (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
76. The CFPB was made the primary enforcing agency for these purposes. Id. § 1031(a)–(b),
12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)–(b); see also id. § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (protecting consumers from “unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination”); id. § 1031(b)–(d), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5531(b)–(d) (defining “unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices” and authorizing
rulemaking for further definition).
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macroprudential and microprudential regulatory powers. In other
words, they were designed to promote financial stability in general, and
bank safety and soundness in particular, to avert a significant bank
failure or another crisis, the source of so much damage to consumers.
The strengthened disclosure and governance regimes of marketconduct regulation were also designed to enlist the discipline of the
market to complement the oversight of regulators. Market and
regulatory discipline would combine to preserve honest and stable
finance.
Herein lies a dilemma: just as markets fail for various reasons,
including information asymmetry,77 agency problems,78 and moral
hazard,79 so too do regulations. This failure can occur by reason of
capture; because of insufficient resources and conflicting missions; and,
most importantly for present purposes, because the regulatory model
struggles to keep pace with the ever-changing marketplace. Despite all
the developments in nearly a century, our regulatory model—and
indeed, Congress itself—continues to presuppose a relatively static
ecology that can be regulated, disciplined, and punished according to
command-and-control techniques. Chief among these techniques are
prescribing rules of conduct and condition in advance; requiring
regulatory surveillance for compliance with these rules; and dictating
ensuing regulatory action, ranging from mild enforcement to outright
seizure of institutions,80 when it becomes evident that an institution has
not or will not comply. This model appeals to the normative ideal of
the rule of law, and it appears to be mitigated by conferring discretion
on regulators who know when they should act mildly or harshly. But it
does not work well anymore.

77. Information asymmetry occurs when one party lacks the same quality or degree of
information as its counterparty and is therefore unable to bargain on equal terms.
78. Market failures caused by agency problems occur when management pursues objectives
that are not necessarily the same as those of the institution’s shareholders or not necessarily for
their benefit.
79. Moral hazard, a concept well known in insurance, exists where the risks and costs of a
particular action are borne by someone other than the actor, leading the actor to take undue risks
because she or the institution will not have to pay for the costs of errors. Financial regulation is
riddled with moral hazard problems, the most well known of which is the notion of “too-big-tofail” institutions that will be kept alive no matter how incompetent because the general public or
taxpayers would have to bear the cost of their failure. See supra note 61.
80. Under the “prompt corrective action” system, regulators can seize an institution while it
is still technically solvent but its capital has fallen below a threshold level of two percent. See 12
U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(3) (2012) (authorizing the responsible agency to place a critically
undercapitalized institution into conservatorship or receivership).
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First, as already discussed, markets are highly dynamic, labile, and
adaptive.81 Rules and reforms are quickly outdated. Indeed, they are
sometimes downright iatrogenic: new rules designed to fix one problem
might well create a host of new problems.82 Old rules that were based
in long-forgotten good sense can be swept away before their value is
fully appreciated.83 And target-based regulation is often self-defeating
for the simple reason that market participants quickly and rationally
adjust their behavior around the “certainty” created by the new
targets.84
To cope with the demands of regulating financial markets, it seems
that, more than ever, greater emphasis must be placed on developing
forms of “adaptive regulation,” as opposed to command-and-control
regulation. The concept of adaptive regulation is evolving as a new
field of exploration in administrative law,85 yet in some ways for
financial regulation it would also constitute a return to, albeit requiring
substantial modernization of, bank safety-and-soundness regulation.86
Second, because of the increasing formalization of our regulatory
framework and the escalating, politically attractive yet ineffective from

81. See supra Part I.A.
82. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK:
HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 39, 40–41 (1998) (providing examples of regulations aimed at curbing
risk that may create additional risks). This phenomenon is sometimes known as the “Cobra
Effect.”
83. This is sometimes referred to as the “paradox of Chesterton’s Fence,” after an
observation in the great author G.K. Chesterton’s 1929 book, THE THING:
In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain
and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists
in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence
or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it
and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more intelligent
type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t
let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me
that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.”
G.K. CHESTERTON, THE THING 35 (Sheed & Ward 1957) (1929).
84. For a discussion of Goodhart’s Law, see supra note 20.
85. See generally Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Regulation in the Amoral Bazaar, 128 S.
AFR. L.J. 253 (2011) (arguing that conceptual frameworks for regulating complex markets are
moving away from directive models in favor of adaptive approaches); Lawrence E. McCray,
Kenneth A. Oye & Arthur C. Petersen, Planned Adaptation in Risk Regulation: An Initial Survey
of US Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation, 77 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE
951 (2010) (surveying U.S. federal regulatory programs concerning the environment, health, and
safety to ascertain which ones have included adaptive features); Jonathan B. Wiener, Better
Regulation in Europe, 59 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 447 (2006) (suggesting that regulatory reforms
in Europe should place greater emphasis on ex post evaluation and adaptive management).
86. For a discussion of flexible safety-and-soundness regulation, see supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
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a regulatory point of view, reliance by Congress on command-andcontrol edicts, financial regulation has become highly adversarial.87
Whereas in an older time a concern on the part of a regulator might be
worked out informally with the financial institution concerned long
before trouble arose, our modern distrust of regulatory discretion,
coupled with the severe consequences of enforcement and the
increasing power of financial institutions, often results in politically
polarized clashes between industry and regulators, on the one hand,
and between partisans on relevant congressional committees, on the
other. The consequences are generally not productive.
B. What Might Dynamic Financial Regulation Look Like?
The dyspeptic condition of modern financial regulation suggests a
need for some substantially new approaches. Identifying such
possibilities involves understanding financial markets as complex
adaptive systems containing fragile strata, exhibiting constant
evolution, and requiring multidisciplinary approaches to their
maintenance.88 Viewed from this perspective, command-and-control
rules are no more than skeletal restraints. Regulators require
considerable ongoing discretion. Equally importantly, they need
resources similar to (though not necessarily in the same quantity as)
those being used by the agents within the markets themselves. Under
this view, the regulators are also market agents. It is for this reason that
adaptive regulation has such an important role to play and commandand-control regulation is so often ineffective. One of the major U.S.
market regulators, the CFTC, has itself recognized the need to rethink
financial regulation, emphasizing principles-based approaches, to meet
the demands of technology-driven financial markets.89
87. For concrete examples of this growing formalism, see supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
88. For a discussion of the application of complexity science to financial regulation, see supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., J. Christopher Giancarlo, Comm’r, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n,
Keynote Address Before the Cato Institute’s Conference on Cryptocurrency: The Policy
Challenges of Decentralized Revolution (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo-14 [https://perma.cc/M27R-SE9W] (emphasizing the need for
global coordination by regulators, who should “create a principles-based approach” and take a
“pragmatic and flexible approach” to the regulation of new technologies (quoting Masamichi
Kono, Financial Services Agency, Japan, Remarks at CFTC International Regulators’ Meeting
(Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.fsa.go.jp/common/conference/danwa/20160315/01.pdf [https://
perma.cc/956D-WXKP])); Timothy Massad, Chairman, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n,
Keynote Address Before the World Federation of Exchanges Annual Meeting, Doha, Qatar (Oct.
19, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-29 [https://perma.cc/
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Apart from the obvious need to respond to recent developments
in technology, there is nothing new in an argument for greater
regulatory discretion in financial regulation. Principles-based (as
opposed to rules-based) regulation, which recognizes the importance
of continuing discretion for regulatory supervision, has long been the
focus of debates on optimal regulation.90 The recognition that cycles
generate crises has led regulators to think in terms of countercyclical
regulation, such as capital “buffers” and contingent convertible bonds91
that morph from debt into equity as circumstances change.92 Turning
to the arena in which we have seen the biggest impact of technology,
Pillar 2 of both Basel II and Basel III93 represent an attempt by
regulators to adapt to highly advanced and perpetually evolving
2PHS-V7ES] (calling for domestic and global market regulators to consider ways to transform
regulatory oversight in light of technological innovation and market transformation).
90. See generally JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS (1997) (offering an analysis of
the relationship between rules and rulemaking and the regulatory process, with a special focus on
financial-services regulation); Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation,
3 CAP. MKTS. L. REV. 425 (2008) (exploring different forms of principles-based regulation and
comparing this regulatory strategy’s strengths and weaknesses to those of traditional rules-based
regulation). For an example in the specific context of banking regulation, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
The ‘Principles’ Paradox, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 175, 176 (2009) (arguing that the efficacy
of principles-based regulation versus rules-based regulation is influenced by the type of
enforcement regime).
91. Contingent convertible bonds are bonds that only convert to equity upon the contingency
of a specified event such as the stock price of a company breaking through a predetermined price.
They are used in financial services to convert bondholders to equity holders when capital falls
below desired levels, thereby eliminating the debtholder status of the owners of the bonds and
strengthening the equity at stake. See, e.g., Definition of Cocos, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/
Term?term=cocos [https://perma.cc/F5YS-LWRX].
92. Countercyclical regulation is designed to impose protective burdens, such as higher
capital requirements, on financial institutions when they and the economy are doing well or, in
the case of debtholders, to require the conversion of their debt into equity once an institution falls
below required capital levels so that debtholders share in the losses alongside equity holders. The
idea is that when an institution gets into trouble or the economy turns bad it is too late to impose
such burdens because this will only make things worse for the institution. See generally, e.g.,
Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181 (2016)
(reviewing the mechanisms of, and tradeoffs resulting from, countercyclical regulation).
93. Pillar 2 of Basel II and Basel III is the supervisory review process articulated in the two
major international standards of banking supervision. For an initial description, see BASEL
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PT. 3: THE SECOND PILLAR—SUPERVISORY REVIEW
PROCESS 204–42, https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128c.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DEV-XGFZ]. This
document has been superseded by ever more elaborations of the Basel framework. Basel II was
introduced in the early 1990s as a more sophisticated framework for managing risk, assessing
capital adequacy, and ensuring consistency in regulatory supervision across the globe. When
Basel II proved inadequate in preventing the 2008 crisis, the Basel Committee set about creating
more refined standards, now contained in a complex and convoluted mélange of documents under
the rubric of Basel III. See Basel III: International Regulatory Frameworks for Banks, BANK FOR
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm [https://perma.cc/U5AS-2RGJ].
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models of risk management.94 And modern capital stress testing is
becoming more dynamic.95 Indeed, one commentator postulates that
stress testing is effectively displacing traditional safety-and-soundness
supervision.96
Quick reflection, however, would reveal that requiring regulators
to be endowed with such tools is a very tall order. The scale, operations,
and complexity of modern financial institutions and even the markets
themselves are immense.97 Manual surveillance of automated activities,
for example, is entirely unrealistic, and the automation of many of the
regulatory tasks traditionally performed manually seems imperative.
Indeed, one leading administrative lawyer has opined that “Robot
Regulators Could Eliminate Human Error,”98 and for many aspects of
monitoring, he might well be right.

94. Basel II was the primary international standard for bank regulation. Although not
mandatory within jurisdictions, regulators, including those within the United States, based their
regulation of large banks on these standards. See History of the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [https://perma.cc/UM3E-7G
V5]. Pillar 2 of Basel II required regulators to monitor risk-management models used by banks
to ensure their adequacy. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, PART 3: THE SECOND PILLAR–SUPERVISORY REVIEW PROCESS 6−9 (2006),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128c.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS9L-3WLS] (outlining the “Supervisory
Review” process).
95. Stress testing is applied by bank regulators to determine whether an institution could
withstand adverse conditions resulting from economic changes. See, e.g., Pavel Kapinos,
Christopher Martin & Oscar Mitnik, Stress Testing Banks: Whence and Whither?, J. FIN. PERSP.
(forthcoming 2016) https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/CFR/2015/WP_2015/WP2015_07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RJ9X-3GDL] (reviewing how stress testing was developed, how it is
implemented, and how it is likely to further develop).
96. Peter Conti-Brown, Stress Tests and the End of Bank Supervision, REGBLOG (Apr. 21,
2016), http://www.regblog.org/2016/04/21/stress-tests-and-the-end-of-bank-supervision/ [https://
perma.cc/E5YU-8QMG].
97. The prudential banking regulators are not as resource constrained as their marketconduct counterparts; they fund their operations from fees charged to the banks, whereas the
primary market-conduct regulators are obliged to seek funding from congressional
appropriations in the current antiregulation environment. This small degree of independence,
however, is not enough to make up for the kinds of resources a command-and-control form of
regulation would require. Not only are there limits to the kinds of fees regulators can get away
with when charging the industry itself, but there are also limitations on how effective such
regulation could be, even in a world of unlimited resources.
98. Cary Coglianese, Robot Regulators Could Eliminate Human Error, REGBLOG (May 16,
2016), http://www.regblog.org/2016/05/16/coglianese-robot-regulators-eliminate-error [https://
perma.cc/PEP2-XVC2].
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C. RegTech
RegTech, the application of technology to regulatory activities,99
is where thinking about regulation has to change. Although
discretionary regulatory judgments are as important as ever, if not
more important, they have to rest on a much more complex base of
data, data tracking, and inferences, themselves a reflection of the
enormous complexity of modern finance. Much of this analysis
requires the aid of automation, so that regulators are able to apply their
expert knowledge to what really matters from a regulatory perspective.
Just as finance is rapidly becoming automated, so too must
regulation. Billions of dollars are being poured into the deployment of
technology in finance, and this has led to a whole new “FinTech”
industry that might, for the first time ever, be reforming the entire
framework of financial services, from high-frequency trading to fraud
prevention to personal wealth management.100 Mobile phones, for
example, are revolutionizing how consumers expect their financial
services to be provided. And these developments are combining at
stunning rates of change.101 FinTech is the new buzzword for the
legions of companies and banks that are now developing high-speed,
automated products and services, using novel techniques including

99. For an explanation of RegTech, see generally INST. OF INT’L FIN., REGTECH IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES: TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS FOR COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING,
https://wwwiif.com/file/14970/download?token=vx29uy05
[https://perma.cc/VKM6-HP8L];
Douglas W. Arner, János Nathan Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the
Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. (forthcoming 2016)
[hereinafter Arner, Barberis & Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of
Financial Regulation], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847806 [https://perma.cc/7JXB-VM53];
Douglas W. Arner, János Nathan Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of Fintech: A New
Post-Crisis Paradigm? (Univ. of H.K., Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2015/047, 2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2676553 [https://perma.cc/L84G-F6QA] (summarizing developments in
RegTech).
100. See Arner, Barberis & Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of
Financial Regulation, supra note 99 (manuscript at 23).
101. The literature on one major example in the financial markets, namely high-frequency or
“algo” trading, is exploding, as are the regulatory concerns. The leading thinkers on this issue are
Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee. See generally ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW
MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: HOW THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IS ACCELERATING
INNOVATION, DRIVING PRODUCTIVITY, AND IRREVERSIBLY TRANSFORMING EMPLOYMENT
AND THE ECONOMY (2011); ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND
MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES
(2014). See also KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (2016) (summarizing
algo trading dynamics succinctly).
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blockchain (distributed ledgers),102 cloud computing, big data,
component architectures, predictive coding, pattern analysis, and many
other technology-enabled platforms, processors, and delivery
systems.103
It is not unrealistic to expect that the regulation of these activities
might also develop in the same direction. Regulators have hundreds of
examiners at each of the big banks, but it seems unlikely that adding
more and more individuals to their teams will help them to meet the
challenge of big bank supervision. Notwithstanding possible cultural
resistance by regulators themselves, the development of automated
compliance, reporting, and monitoring is perhaps inevitable because it
is hard to see how they will otherwise meet the demands of regulating
extreme financial complexity. Large amounts of automation might be
our only hope for cabining the gigantic and dynamic financial industry
within the limits of safety and fair conduct.
There have been precursors to this development. Currency
transaction reporting, involving millions of daily transactions, is
monitored by the Treasury Department on an automated basis.104 Both
market-conduct and prudential regulators monitor high-frequency
trading using automation techniques.105 Perhaps the clearest example
of major collaboration of algorithmic industry and regulation is the
implementation of the regulatory-supervision components of Pillar 2

102. One example of this is the proof of concept performed by R3. See R3, http://r3cev.com
[https://perma.cc/Z8UQ-NGAQ]; Kim S. Nash, Key Blockchain Vendors, Cloud Providers
Square off in Major Test, WALL STREET J.: CIO J. (Mar. 2, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/
cio/2016/03/02/key-blockchain-vendors-cloud-providers-square-off-in-major-test/ [https://perma.
cc/89Z5-SS95].
103. See U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., FINTECH FUTURES: THE UK AS A WORLD LEADER
IN FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES (2015) (presenting a survey focused on London, a leader in the
field of financial technologies).
104. Regulations promulgated under The Bank Secrecy Act require banks to file
electronically a Currency Transaction Report for every transaction of more than $10,000. 31
C.F.R. § 1010.311; see Currency Transaction Reporting—Overview, FED. FIN. INST.
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_017.htm
[https://perma.cc/LC93-4CER].
105. For example, the SEC has implemented a system (called “MIDAS”) that combines
advanced market-activity monitoring with empirical data to provide a better picture of what is
taking place in the market. According to the SEC, MIDAS collects about one billion records from
the proprietary feeds from each of the thirteen national equity exchanges. See MIDAS Market
Information Data Analytics System, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/market
structure/midas.html#.WAD1mzsyDFl [https://perma.cc/CX7V-SJ5Q]. Apparently the system
will only be fully operational in three years. See Francine McKenna, Critics Say SEC’s Audit Trail
Plan Falls Short, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 27, 2016, 12:51 PM), http://www.marketwatch.
com/story/critics-say-secs-audit-trail-plan-falls-short-2016-04-27 [https://perma.cc/Y6QC-VFT2].
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of the Basel II and III frameworks of risk management.106 From a
command-and-control perspective, regulators’ reliance on the
automated risk-management systems adopted by big banks seems to
be an abdication of regulatory responsibility: regulators are expected
to do such monitoring themselves and not rely on the systems installed
by the banks. Yet from the premises adopted in this Article, which
emphasize the constant fluidity and adaptive character of financial
markets107 and the resource constraints under which regulators have to
operate,108 it seems entirely unrealistic to assume that regulators could
even remotely supply the personnel power to perform their own
evaluations of the risks incurred by complex finance.
For this reason, this Article urges that we recognize the
importance of a companion development to FinTech, namely
RegTech,109 which involves the development, testing, and deployment
of automated systems of compliance, reporting, and surveillance by
regulators. Initial work on such a project has begun in many areas. The
Financial Conduct Authority in the United Kingdom has a “regulatory
sandbox” in which innovative pilot models are being tested with the
banks.110 The United Kingdom,111 Singapore, China, and Hong Kong

106. As risk management has become more automated and complex, regulators have had to
increasingly rely on the bank’s own risk-management models to discharge their regulatory
responsibilities. The approach they adopt is effectively codified in national implementations of
Basel II and, now, Basel III, which require them to evaluate and approve the bank riskmanagement models (“supervisory review”). See supra note 94. The bank models are highly
automated and could not realistically be replicated by the regulators themselves. Highly
complicated distinctions are drawn in the way in which various categories of banks are treated.
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL STANDARDS—REGULATORY
CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (RCAP), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation.
htm?m=3%7C14%7C587 [https://perma.cc/68N3-8UGH] (surveying progress around the world
in implementing the Basel framework); see, e.g., FED. RESERVE SYS., BASEL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/USImplementation.htm
[https://perma.cc/9SDN-MA47] (providing a digest of the rules promulgated by the Federal
Reserve to implement the Basel framework in the United States).
107. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
109. See U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 103 (presenting a helpful and quite detailed
outline of RegTech’s potential in modern bank regulation); see also Arner, Barberis & Buckley,
FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, supra note 99 (manuscript
at 30–43).
110. See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (FCA), REGULATORY SANDBOX (2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB62-4V
YM] (providing an overview of the regulatory “sandbox” and its implementation).
111. See, e.g. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., BUSINESS PLAN 2016/17, at 32−33 (2016), https://
www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/business-plan-2016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/234J-RJ3V];
FCA, supra note 110.
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have provided some government sponsorship112 for RegTech pilots,
and the U.S. OCC might be receptive.113 A recent report by the
Institute of International Finance114 outlines the many areas in which
RegTech has begun to emerge in the United States. Tentative
examples are to be found in the fields of shareholder disclosures,115
trading-behavior analysis,116 trading compliance,117 organizational trust
dynamics,118 and even capital regulation119 (particularly in stress testing
and risk weighting). A major, and possibly even transformative,
development has been IBM’s acquisition of the leading regulatorycompliance consulting firm, Promontory Financial Group, for the
express purpose of introducing the immense artificial-intelligence
analytics of Watson to the tasks of regulatory compliance and
monitoring.120
112. See, e.g., Arner, Barberis & Buckley, The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis
Paradigm?, supra note 99 (manuscript at 20−28) (discussing developments in Asia).
113. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE
INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2016),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pubresponsible-innovative-banking-system-occ-perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2MJ-79QD].
114. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 99, at 3–4. See generally Arner, Barberis & Buckley,
FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, supra note 99; DELOITTE,
REGTECH IS THE NEW FINTECH: HOW AGILE REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY IS HELPING FIRMS
BETTER UNDERSTAND AND MANAGE THEIR RISKS (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/
dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-services/performancemagazine/articles/lu-how-agileregulatory-technology-is-helping-firms-better-understand-and-manage-their-risks-24052016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5YG-RK5N]; Lucy McNulty, Regtech: Meet the New Faces of Compliance, FIN.
NEWS (Jan. 29, 2016), http://thetally.efinancialnews.com/2016/01/meet-new-faces-compliance/
?mod=fintech-tally [https://perma.cc/T2EG-WLZJ] (listing new RegTech companies). The
Financial Times has a special section on FinTech that also focuses on RegTech. FIN. TIMES, THE
FUTURE OF FINTECH, https://www.ft.com/reports/future-of-fintech [https://perma.cc/4T63V69F].
115. E.g., FUNDAPPS, https://www.fundapps.co [https://perma.cc/MM48-NAGR] (organizing
regulatory information and offering a cloud-based system for shareholder-disclosure filings across
global jurisdictions).
116. E.g., SYBENETIX, http://www.sybenetix.com/solutions/compass [https://perma.cc/X7XW
-KZDQ] (providing systems to monitor market activity and detect unusual trading patterns).
117. E.g., OPENGAMMA, http://www.opengamma.com [https://perma.cc/E8EF-NVN6]
(offering margin-calculation solutions for clients).
118. E.g., STARLING, http://starlingtrust.com [https://perma.cc/37HT-MJSJ] (stating a mission
“to uncover the world’s trust networks”).
119. E.g., SUADE, http://suade.org [https://perma.cc/RC4H-95UY] (providing a regulation-asa-service platform in collaboration with regulators and regulatory models).
120. The acquisition was announced in September 2016 and has been greeted by the financial
industry as introducing a whole new order of computing power to the field of financial regulation.
See Penny Crosman, IBM Buying Promontory Clinches It: RegTech Is Real, AM. BANKER (Sept.
29, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/ibm-buying-promontoryclinches-it-regtech-is-real-1091692-1.html [https://perma.cc/7E7E-L3DR]; John Mannes, Watson
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The potential of these new possibilities remains barely discernible,
but it does seem that automation will produce an ever-expanding range
of regulatory techniques. Among the most well-publicized examples of
productivity-enhancing automation in the regulatory field is
blockchain, the underlying technology of Bitcoin,121 which holds out
the promise of automated authentication and verification across a
broad range of activities that regulators have traditionally had to
monitor “by hand.”122 There is also automated trading compliance123
and an emerging vista of collaborative monitoring between regulators
and financial institutions themselves, such that the data that are
produced by the systems of the institutions are themselves also coded
to provide pertinent regulatory information automatically.124

Financial Services Is Born Out of IBM’s Purchase of Promontory Financial Group, TECHCRUNCH
(Sept. 29, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/29/watson-financial-services-is-born-out-ofibms-purchase-of-promontory-financial-group/ [https://perma.cc/E5GH-XMYG] (commentary
and analysis); Press Release, IBM, IBM Announces Planned Acquisition of Promontory to
Transform Regulatory Compliance with Watson (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www-03.ibm.com/
press/us/en/pressrelease/50599.wss [https://perma.cc/K5M4-CNX4] (announcing acquisition to
create “Watson Financial Services”). The IBM–Promontory deal has been compared with other
recent alliances between financial organizations and advanced digital-computing companies, such
as NASDAQ and Digital Reasoning, as well as Credit Suisse and Plantir. See Ben Dipietro, The
Morning Risk Report: IBM-Promontory Deal Marks Growth of AI-Driven Compliance, WALL
STREET J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Oct. 3, 2016, 7:11 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
riskandcompliance/2016/10/03/the-morning-risk-report-ibm-promontory-deal-marks-growth-ofai-driven-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/4PAY-J4BM].
121. See, e.g., Pete Rizzo, KPMG: Blockchain Could Be ‘Antidote’ to High Cost of Regulation,
COINDESK (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/kpmg-blockchain-antidote-regulatory-costs/
[https://perma.cc/RKZ8-5KW7] (summarizing responses by professional-service firms to the
evolving blockchain-technology space). Blockchain is a data-transport system that permits the
creation of decentralized ledgers, such that intermediaries can be bypassed altogether and smart
algorithms can be introduced, for example, to remove previously human tasks involved in
validating agreements to create self-executing “smart contracts.” While Bitcoin, a crypto- or
digital currency, is a better-known concept to the public, blockchain, the technology upon which
Bitcoin depends, has a much broader range of potential applications. For a crisp description of
blockchain, see, for example, Steven Norton, CIO Explainer: What Is Blockchain?, WALL STREET
J. CIO J. (Feb. 2, 2016, 12:49 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/02/02/cio-explainer-what-isblockchain/ [https://perma.cc/CS9L-8Q5A].
122. For example, money could be “wired” directly from a payor to a payee without the need
for the transfer to go through an intermediary such as SWIFT, and self-validating stock
transactions could be made directly between buyer and seller without the need for a
clearinghouse. See Norton, supra note 121.
123. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
124. For a broadening range of possibilities, see, e.g., CREDIT SUISSE, BLOCKCHAIN—THE
TRUST DISRUPTER (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.the-blockchain.com/docs/Credit-SuisseBlockchain-Trust-Disrupter.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PYK-RJ5X]; INST. INT’L FIN., REGTECH IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 99.
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Of course, the new development, discipline, and promise of
RegTech will not displace the need for constant adjustments to the
models to keep pace with the changing marketplace. Nor would it
eliminate a constant need to handle exceptions to automated
notifications, fix bad algorithms, and so on. Regulatory judgment based
on experience and changing overall circumstances will continue to have
a central role to play, so high-quality regulators will continue to be
indispensable. For example, data can produce signals of financial
activity gone awry, but regulatory discretion is still needed to
determine whether specific trends are sufficient cause for concern to
warrant regulatory intervention. “Big picture” macroprudential issues
and public-policy goals that transcend the immediate interests of
specific institutions, all matters with which regulators are likely to be
better acquainted than businesspeople focused on the immediate
concerns of their businesses, have to be factored into decisions about
whether regulatory action is becoming necessary. Regulators would
need models and algorithms, but these would not simply be the same
ones developed and used by the banks that they regulate, because
regulatory supervision and operational risk management are separate
activities serving distinct purposes. The former are designed to serve
the public purpose, and the latter are designed to promote the
profitability of the bank.
Finally, the regulator-set algorithmic rules would themselves
embody as many policy choices and legal validity issues as the
regulations governing the conduct or circumstances in question.
Regulators would have to demonstrate that their systems are reliable
and that whatever discretion is being exercised in establishing and
maintaining such systems is within the scope of their legal authority. In
short, regulators would continue to play critical roles; they would just
rely much more on automation than is presently the case and is how we
presently conceive the role of regulation.
CONCLUSION
Of course, none of these proposals would counter the arguments
of those who believe regulation to be inherently suspect or regulatory
discretion to be inherently untrustworthy.125 Nor would they satisfy
125. Skepticism about the value of regulation and regulators has long been a feature of public
choice theory. More recently, in the context of financial regulation, it is found in various formats.
See, e.g., ALLISON, supra note 42, at 5−6; Mark A. Calabria, Dir. Fin. Reg. Studs., Cato Inst.,
Remarks at the University of Minnesota School of Law: Financial Regulation: Market or
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those with a punitive mindset. In addition, it would be naive to imagine
that automated supervision would eliminate political controversy,
since the bases for disagreeing on policy solutions rest on different
views of economic behavior and regulatory effectiveness.
Nevertheless, although some wrongs can be righted by privateattorney-general suits, the central challenges of bank soundness and
financial stability cannot really be addressed effectively through such
mechanisms. For those of us who continue to believe that regulatory
moderation of markets is essential, and believe in the merits of
pursuing the goal of an ideal balance between market discipline and
regulatory discipline, this Article suggests that we will attain more
productive and effective results by seeking a modernization of
regulation along similar lines to the modernization of our technologydriven finance and technology-oriented society itself.
If this view is correct, then automation not only presents unique
new solutions but also great challenges for financial regulation. The
successful development of financial RegTech will entail a complex
blend, on the one hand, of accurate and well-articulated algorithms
that can reduce to automation a large array of essentially mechanistic
analyses and, on the other, of a series of flexible and skillfully identified
public-policy judgments that will promote the values of stability,
fairness, efficiency, transparency, and manageability all that partisans
presumably hold as their ideal. This goal is a very tall order, but it will
not be attained through ham-handed legislation, regulation, or blunt
resistance. It will only be achieved over time, with the introduction of
many new skill sets and a positive desire to create a financial system
that is regulated reasonably and for the common weal.

Government (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.cato.org/publications/speeches/financial-regulationmarket-or-government [https://perma.cc/G4UP-FRYV] (stating that regulation generates moral
hazard and that regulators have the wrong incentives to do the right thing). See also supra text
accompanying note 53.

